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European Union Integration and National Self-Determination
Mare Ushkovska
International Communities Organisation
Recent demands for secession in several EU member states bring the issue of selfdetermination to the forefront of the debate about the future of the European Union. This
article explores the European Union’s attitudes toward the international right to selfdetermination in the context of the rising salience of the greater political union between
member states. The focus of the European project, in direct contrast to the glorification of
nationhood, is on consensual decision-making rather than sovereignty, making selfdetermination obsolete in a reality of EU integration. This research finds that recognition of,
or references to, the right to self-determination of peoples are absent from EU law sources.
Official EU statements in the United Nations interpret the right to self-determination as the
presence of a representative democracy and the ability to enjoy human rights within existing
states. This interpretation implies that secession campaigns in EU countries are unfounded.
The European Union demonstrates a strong preference for various forms of internal selfdetermination (extended autonomy of regions, minority rights, and language rights) as an
approach to address the diversity of peoples and regions within its borders. But the European
Union has no legislative competences in these areas and the enactment of such policies is
dependent solely on the goodwill of individual member states. By analyzing past cases of
recognition by the European Union of newly independent states in the wider European
region, this article demonstrates that they have been inconsistent and arbitrary, dependent on
the strategic interests of individual member states rather than clear normative criteria.
___________________________________________________________________________

In

this age of globalization and regional integration in Europe, when the growth of
supranationalist identities seems to be on the rise, the age-old struggle for independent
governance of individual ethno-linguistic groups remains. Yet self-determination of peoples,
while widely analyzed from a theoretical and historical perspective, is rarely discussed in the
extant literature on the European Union. Furthermore, political debates concerning the selfdetermination of peoples have long been side-lined with the rising salience of a deeper
political union among European states. This article addresses in detail the European Union’s
attitudes toward self-determination, as part of the corpus of international human rights and in
view of European integration processes. It also seeks to provide a clearer understanding of
the European Union’s position on the various ways in which national self-determination
could take form on the political map of Europe.

The European Project
Sovereignty and Supranationalism
The European project, a peace project in its essence, was developed in the aftermath of the
Second World War as a joint attempt among European states to begin a new chapter in which
cooperation, solidarity, and partnership would replace the rivalry, nationalism, and prejudice
that were believed to have led to two devastating wars on the continent in only thirty years. It
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was perceived that individual European states were not able to maintain peace and security
and that nationalist rule should be replaced by a common path that involves forsaking
sovereign exclusivity in policy making. For this reason, the European project was conceived
in principle as antinational,1 or, at the very least, supranational or postnational.2 The Treaty
on European Union in its article 1 states that the treaty “marks a new stage in the process of
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.” Thus, the European project,
which relies on a supranational framework, offers a direct contrast to the glorification of
nationhood that characterized international politics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
The conviction the European Union holds today, reminiscent of the Vienna system
established by Metternich in the nineteenth century, is that long-term peace and prosperity
require the existence of a larger multicultural polity, where national identities and interests
take a step back in the name of a greater good. European Commission president Jean-Claude
Juncker has been very vocal in his criticism of attempts to “deconstruct” the bloc into
national subdivisions, claiming, “There is no future for Europe as single nations.”3 The
European Union favors consolidation over fragmentation and sees “unity in diversity” as its
raison d’être.
The European project is seen as incompatible, ideologically and systemically, with the
pursuit of self-determination of peoples and with national sovereignty. Member states
renounce a degree of their sovereignty when they join the European Union, because they
agree to a consensual decision-making process on matters covered by the treaties. Even the
decision to accede to the bloc is not an act of self-determination, since it requires the consent
of all other member states (Treaty on European Union [TEU], art. 49). Some scholars would
argue that it is paradoxical for regions or stateless nations in the European Union to seek to
establish an independent state by calling on the right to self-determination, only to be able to
later rejoin the European Union—a process in which they would substitute self-determination
for co-determination—as new legal entities.4 One way in which European integration has led
to the demystification of the concept of traditional national sovereignty is through
undermining state competences in various domains, from monetary policy to immigration
policy, and normalizing the existence of common regimes and the doctrine of shared
sovereignty.5 Nicolas Levrat argues that because national projects are constrained by codetermination in the European Union, individual European peoples no longer exercise selfdetermination and the concept of self-determination in a supranational European polity
becomes obsolete.6
Nevertheless, the project of the “ever closer Union” has never been without its many
challengers. In the first stages of European unification, in the early 1950s, the ambitious idea
of developing a common European defense community met with rejection by the French
parliament because of the unwillingness of France to concede its national sovereignty in the
area of defense.7 Decades later, the rejection of the so-called European Constitution by a
definitive majority of citizens in the Netherlands and France was a symbolic line in the sand
marking the extent to which nations were willing to see the European supranational entity
override nation-states. Nonetheless, political leaders across the European Union pressed on
with their vision and introduced the Lisbon Treaty—a revised and renamed version of the
Constitutional Treaty—which national governments could ratify without the need for a public
consultation in the form of a referendum. Yet, the unprecedented rise in support for
Eurosceptic parties over the past years among some of its founding members, such as Italy
and France, as well as numerous other large member states, such as Hungary, Austria,
Poland, and the United Kingdom, is a clear indication of the crisis the European project is
experiencing in its objective to supersede national decision-making authority. As plans are
proposed for further delegation of sovereignty to EU institutions for the purpose of common
2
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border control and immigration policy, member states begin to dig in their proverbial heels in
resistance to the proposed loss of powers of member states to (self-)determine their own
paths. The decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, motivated by the
value the British people place on sovereign powers, created a significant crack in the
feasibility and durability of this postnational model of governance.
The Construct of a European Identity
The process of European integration, as spearheaded by the European Union since the second
half of the twentieth century, has proven itself to be a process of transforming notions of
states and nations, while at the same fostering a new polity.8 The project to construct a
European identity follows a formula similar to how national identities are developed. If
national identities rest on the common history and shared culture, customs, and values of a
group of people, then European identity would be forged on the grounds of the common
civilizational heritage (Christianity, Roman law, the Renaissance, democracy, etc.), mutual
interests, and unifying value system of European states and their citizens. Furthermore, as
collective identities are bolstered by the existence of a common enemy, or differentiation
from the “other,” a European identity is reinforced when juxtaposed with the “rest of the
world.” Thus, at various times during its development, the European project was presented in
opposition to the Soviet Union, to emerging powers in the global east, or most recently to the
United States, as it sought to become an “element of equilibrium” in a growing multipolar
world.9 Finally, ideological identity and the political form are closely related,10 and states
with their own sovereign institutions are best placed to enable the development of loyalty
among their citizens toward that state as well as a national consciousness. Similarly,
European institutions—those with democratic legitimacy and those without—are there to
give a political form of the supranational European project and tend to inspire a sense of
belonging among peoples that transcends national borders.
The concept of European identity first appeared officially in 1973, when the heads of
state or government of the nine countries that constituted the European Community at the
time held a summit in Copenhagen, where they produced the Declaration on European
Identity, through which they affirmed their determination to introduce the concept of
European identity into their common foreign relations. The broad (and somewhat vague)
definition of European identity offered in the declaration involves the common heritage and
interests, the degree of common action of member states “in relation to the rest of the world,”
and the “dynamic nature of European unification.”11 The original purpose of the declaration,
directed toward third states, was to underscore the shared values that distinguished member
states from other subjects of international law.12 At the time no thought was given to creating
a European identity that would sustain a supranational project or a sense of loyalty toward the
European Community.13 The text of the declaration notably makes two references to the
common European civilization of member states and goes on to specify two key elements of
how the European identity is to be perceived. First, emphasis is placed on the common values
and principles of member states: democratic governance, the rule of law, human rights, and
social justice. Second, in foreign affairs, the member states should progress toward common
positions so they speak with one voice, allowing the “distinct character of the European entity
to be respected.”14 As time since has shown, the first element has become the pillar of
European integration, the second its ultimate purpose.
In keeping with the 1861 statement by Massimo d’Azeglio, a leader of the Italian
unification, “We have made Italy; now we must make Italians,”15 the European Union today
seeks to seal the unification of the continent by making Europeans. Just as states need to
create conditions by which all the people living within their territory identify with the state
and feel a sense of belonging and loyalty, so must the European Union foster the European
3
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identity. This is no small feat. Though the “European” denominator is at times used to
distinguish the place of origin of citizens of European countries from those of other
continents in interactions on an international level, there is as yet no European demos as a
collective of which to speak. The European Union comprises twenty-eight individual nationstates and many more peoples with separate identities. The Treaty on European Union,
however, commits, in its preamble (par. 11), to reinforcing the European identity and its
independence and, in article 4(2), to respecting the national identities of member states.
Since, legally, the European Union is a sui generis entity, it can only follow that the sense of
community related to it will also be sui generis, rather than mimic national sentiments.16
Former European commissioner Olli Rehn believed that it would be ill-advised to pursue
a plan whereby a superior and common European identity would seek to replace the existing
national identities and the different political cultures of EU member states. The idea of
eliminating all national sentiments is based merely on idealism, whereas reality suggests that
such attempts would result in a pushback from nations, ultimately backfiring on the
unification idea because it could create resentment among member states and resistance
toward further integration. Instead, Rehn considered the nurturing of a dual identity as the
preferable approach, with “the national identity being dominant for most people and the
European identity being . . . supplementary and in accordance with the national identity,”17 in
following with how European citizenship is supplemental to national citizenship. German
chancellor Angela Merkel recently expressed the same view: “I think we should try to do two
things at once: be European, but also regard our home countries as part of our identity. They
don’t have to be opposites.”18
Developing a common European identity is important because it may be needed to
bolster the legitimacy of the European Union. Acceptance of an EU identity is theoretically
linked to the acceptance of the European Union not merely as an important decision-making
actor in the global arena that supersedes the domains on member states but as a truly
representative polity that works for the greater good of its citizens. It is a vital question of
image for the European Union, as the European integration project moves forward because,
as Hristina Runcheva Tasev puts it, “many scholars of democratic theory pre-suppose a
shared identity to set the boundaries of legitimate government—and this is complicated for
the political system like the EU.”19 As noted previously, the close connection between
ideological identity and political form guides the European Union to invest in the continual
construction of a consciousness of commonality between the citizens of member states and
the strengthening of a European identity through the setting up of a variety of educational
programs, formal and informal (such as those on European studies in many universities
around the European Union), through the use of public diplomacy, and through modern
media. This fostering of a shared sense of belonging between Europeans would help
consolidate the European Union’s supranational institutions and further broaden their
competences by building its democratic legitimacy, because, as Runcheva Tasev points out,
“democracy is not merely an electoral matter”; it “also requires socio-cultural cohesion in an
institutional context or a public sphere.”20 There is as yet no analysis that shows the effect of
European institutions on constructing a European identity.

EU Approaches to Addressing Diversity of Peoples and Regions
Minority Rights
According to estimates, roughly 10 percent of the 500 million citizens of the European Union
belong to a national minority group. The wide range of statistical-data-collection practices
with regard to minorities in individual member states, however, makes it difficult to obtain a
4
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definitive figure.21 Empirical research on minority issues has been further hampered by the
varying definitions of minorities, particularly ethnic minorities, between states. Many of these
minorities are peoples who have a national state but for historical or other reasons find
themselves living beyond the delineated boundaries of that state, usually in border regions of
neighboring countries. Among these are the 1.2 million Hungarians in Romania and the large
number of Russians living in the Baltic states. Other ethnic minorities can be naturalized
immigrants and their descendants, among whom are the estimated 3 million people of
Turkish origin living in Germany. Finally, there are the autochthonous groups who do not
have an independent state of their own and who, despite their inhabiting a region of a larger
state for many centuries, have preserved distinctive cultural traits. These groups are the focus
of this research. For them, unlike for other minorities, no independent political entity exists in
which they form a national majority. Nevertheless, perhaps not surprisingly, the legal corpus
of the European Union contains no provisions that distinguish these peoples from other
minority groups. Thus, the only way to gain insight into how the European Union addresses
the diversity of peoples within its borders is to review the EU mechanisms, if any, for the
protection of minorities in its broadest sense.
The most striking observation is that minorities were mentioned for the first time in
primary EU law in the Lisbon Treaty. Before this treaty was signed, there was no legal basis
for group rights of national minorities in member states, and any protection against
discrimination had to be founded on general human rights instruments. In essence, this was
the position often held by political entities centered on the civic form of identity—as in the
European Union—that strong social and economic individual rights make group rights
redundant. Avoiding topics of national minorities followed logically from the European
Union’s long-term objective of reducing nationalist discourse and keeping considerations of
national differences to a minimum. At the same time, “respect for and protection of
minorities” was one of the Copenhagen Criteria obligatory for all candidate states wishing to
join the European Union.22 Consequently, minorities in candidate states were in a better legal
position to seek group rights than those in EU member states. And though the European
Parliament has attempted to draft charters on minority and group rights, none of them has
ever been put to a vote.23
Minorities did receive a mention in article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, as well as in article 21
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has full legal effect for both EU member states
and EU institutions but only in the context of general nondiscrimination provisions.
Nevertheless, the issue of competences regarding the implementation of these rights uncovers
a lack of ability by the European Union to act. That is, in keeping with the subsidiarity
principle, competences that are not explicitly conferred to the European Union remain in the
remits of member states (TEU, art. 4(1)). Specifically, all the areas of exclusive EU
competence are listed in article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
and a closer inspection reveals that issues concerning language, culture, education, or regions
are not among EU competences. Therefore, all claims regarding respect for minority rights
remain solely declaratory because the European Union leaves legislation of minority rights to
the discretion of member states. Once a state has acceded to the European Union, the union
does not consider that state’s collective minority issues as its competence by the treaties.
Yet, the mere fact that the European Union included, as one of the core values on which
the union is founded, respect for “the rights of persons belonging to minorities” (TEU, art. 2)
denotes support—though moral—for the promotion of minority rights within individual
member states and the rationality of group rights for national minorities as one of the
expressions of internal self-determination of peoples. The problem lies in the European
Union’s institutional inability to produce any compulsory legislation and top-down
mechanisms for member states, which in turn allows states to push back on measures that
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they may perceive as threatening their national interests. Consequently, it is not possible to
discuss a unitary EU policy on minorities and their role in society or in the democratic
structures on a national and on a supranational level.
Most, if not all, EU member states do recognize the need for attention to national
minorities, in terms of their social inclusion, nondiscrimination against them, and protection
of their culture, as can be seen by their positions in other intergovernmental organizations
that deal with minority issues. When in 1992 the UN General Assembly passed the
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, no EU member state opposed it. Every EU member state is at the same
time a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and has agreed
to the 1990 Copenhagen Document, a large portion of which is dedicated to minority rights.
Yet, while almost all EU member states have become parties to the Council of Europe’s
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities from 1995, a notable
exception is France (where the collection of statistical data on race, ethnicity, and religion is
banned by law),24 which has not signed the convention, and Greece, Belgium, and
Luxemburg, which have signed but not ratified it.
Language Rights
The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages from 1992, established by the
Council of Europe, has had a similar fate. France, Italy, and Malta have chosen not to ratify
the charter, while Greece, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, and the three Baltic states have
refused even to sign it. The protection of linguistic diversity in the European Union suffered a
serious setback when France stated that, if it ever decides to ratify the European Charter for
Regional and Minority Languages, it will emphasize that it views the charter solely as an
instrument to protect Europe’s linguistic heritage in general terms and not as a tool that
protects language minorities, such as those who speak the regional languages of Corsican,
Breton, Alsatian, and others in France.25 Ironically, article 1 of the charter states that the
purpose of the charter with regard to regional and minority languages is defined in the
following manner: languages that are “traditionally used within a given territory of a State by
nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State’s
population” but are “different from the official language(s) of that State,” not including
“dialects of the official language(s) of the State or the languages of migrants.”26 The
definition of the scope of languages that are spoken by a numerical minority but have a
traditional link with a given territory, unlike languages of immigrant communities, clearly
points to the languages of stateless nations and historic regions, such as Welsh, Scottish
Gaelic, Breton, Occitan, Sorbian, Basque, and Galician, or autochthonous minorities, such as
German in parts of Poland and Italy, though none of these languages is listed by name.
The position expressed by France, one of the largest EU member states, creates a
roadblock to the linguistic rights of stateless nations, particularly as expressed in article 3(3)
of the Treaty on European Union, which proclaims that the European Union “shall respect its
rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is
safeguarded and enhanced.” Although the treaty is vague on the scope of language rights,
since this provision is in continuation of the same article that calls for the “rights of persons
belonging to minorities,” it would follow that respect for cultural and linguistic diversity
would go beyond the twenty-four official EU languages and include the sixty regional and
minority languages spoken around the European Union.27 It has been suggested that one of
the key reasons for France’s lack of support for the promotion of the status of minority or
regional languages stems from the perceived links between some of its regional languages
with separatist movements, such as in Corsica.28
6
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Nevertheless, some contend that the opposite cause and effect relationship is true. By
suppressing regional languages and ignoring the demand for wider recognition and
preservation of the linguistic heritage of stateless nations, states may further exacerbate the
divide between those peoples and their national majority and strengthen secessionist
movements.29 The noticeable rise of independence campaigns by several western European
regions is recent years has brought to the attention of the European Union that stateless
nations want to see their culture and languages included and respected in the European arena,
on an equal footing with those of nations with sovereign states. It has also been argued that
the European Union acts in a discriminatory manner by not allowing EU citizens who speak a
language other than the twenty-four official EU languages to communicate with EU
institutions in their own language.30 This discrimination applies especially to languages such
as Catalan, Basque, Welsh, and Scottish Gaelic, which have official status as regional
languages in their states but are not official languages of the European Union or the treaties, a
fact made that much more poignant when one considers that they have more native speakers
than some official EU languages, such as Maltese and Irish.
As mentioned previously, however, the amount of policy adjustment the EU institutions
can do in this respect, without the political will of member states, is severely limited because
language policy falls under the subsidiarity principle in the European Union and is an
exclusive competence of member states. Still, the European Union can and does support the
measures taken by central and local governments toward protecting minority and regional
languages, primarily by allocating funding for educational programs and multilingualism
projects and research, as well as for media dissemination of minority and regional
languages.31 The European Parliament has encouraged the promotion of these languages. In
2006, the European Parliament decided by a majority that native speakers of the regional
languages with official status in Spain and the United Kingdom can communicate in writing
with the Parliament and receive a response in their language.32 But these regional languages
may not be used to speak in plenary sessions or committee meetings of the European
Parliament, a privilege reserved for official EU languages. Similarly, the European Council
agreed to allow for certain EU documents also to be translated into languages that have an
official status in one of the member states, provided that member state agrees to cover the
costs associated with the translation, as did Spain with regard to the Catalan, Basque, and
Galician languages.33
Regional Rights
Contemporary debates about self-determination in Europe, however, are not driven
exclusively by cultural, linguistic, or ethnic perspectives. In many instances this cultural
element is secondary. What emerges is a marked tendency to promote the relevance of
territorial self-government of stateless nations, placing the focus on advancing the status of
regions. Most self-determination movements in the European Union embrace the idea of civic
regionalism so that the pursuit of self-rule is connected to territorial autonomy, yet without
the exclusivity of the traditional concepts of nationalism.34 Consequently, the postnational
entity that the European Union strives to be seeks to manage the diversity of it member states,
and the diversity of regions within those states, by changing certain key state paradigms, that
is, (1) by modulating the role of national borders, and (2) by encouraging subnational forms
of self-rule.
The transformation of how EU internal borders have been perceived since the
introduction of the freedom of movement and residence of peoples with the Maastricht
Treaty, especially under the Schengen agreements, has become an opportunity for mitigating
the thorny issue of the relative discrepancy between political and ethnic borders of European
7
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peoples. Empirical studies have demonstrated that a dualism often exists in identities among
peoples in border regions of Europe, such that they identify sometimes with their state of
citizenship and at other times with their ethnic group, or they retain at once a sense of
national and regional belonging.35 The removal of the functional significance of interstate
boundaries that allows the peoples of the European Union to move freely across borders is
believed to render irredentist movements pointless. Furthermore, it helps the narrative of a
multilayered governance in the European Union, because the co-existence of national and
supranational policy-making normalizes the idea of subnational governments, which would
not be perceived as threats to state sovereignty. Thus, the concept of “permeable borders” is
believed to help keep the territorial integrity of states intact while resolving potential
frustrations of minorities and border regions.
To this effect, the principle of subsidiarity—according to which governmental functions
should be performed at the lowest level of government possible and thus states should
execute only those tasks that cannot be done at a local level—was promoted by the European
Union and accepted, in general, by regions and stateless nations who saw in this principle an
opportunity to gain greater regional powers. It is important to note, however, that greater
power for the regions was not the originally intended goal of the European Union’s touted
principle of subsidiarity, which aimed instead at reassuring national governments against
fears that the European Union’s supranational institutions would weaken their competences.
The regional and local aspects of subsidiarity were mentioned for the first time only with the
Lisbon Treaty (TEU, art. 5(3)), and then only in reference to a member state’s choice of
whether or not to act at a central level.
The concept of a “Europe of the Regions” emerged in the 1990s, when the forces of
globalization and economic interdependence, on one hand, and the prospect of deeper
European integration and stronger EU institutions, on the other hand, were seemingly diluting
the relevance of the doctrine of the nation-state as the optimal political form. Individual states
were seen to be too small to compete on the global market but at the same time too large to
fully represent the local democratic will of their citizens. Thus, regions in European states
were to be gradually included in the decision-making arrangements of the European
Community as a third actor in its promoted “multi-layered” policy-making structure,36 in an
attempt to “reflect better the cultural and national divisions within Europe.”37 This concept,
of course, was focused not on cultural regions alone but on all regions equally.38 Over the
years, regions have opened their lobbying offices in Brussels as a demonstration of their new
role as stakeholders in the European Union, bypassing states as the traditional link between
the subnational and supranational governments and seeking unimpeded access to EU
institutions. From a mere 15 regional offices in 1988, their number rose to more than 160 in
2002 and almost 200 in 2017.39 Some analysts have suggested that one of the driving factors
for an increased regional presence in Brussels is the element of linguistic and cultural
identities that differ from those on the state level and the intention to gain support from the
commission on points of discord with their central governments.40
More than two decades have passed, however, and the concept of a Europe of the
Regions has been discredited. While regions have made progress and have been given a place
at the table in certain EU forums, time has shown that their presence has in many aspects
remained symbolic and the European Union has remained a state-centric system. While the
concept of state sovereignty has evolved to become more flexible and accommodating for a
degree of shared competences with supranational and subnational governments, the predicted
decline and replacement of the nation-state has not materialized. The abandonment of
optimism related to the Europe of the Regions plan has two main causes. First, contrary to the
expectation that regionalist separatist tendencies would be abandoned, many nationalist
parties have seized on the political momentum to give a boost to their movements for greater
8
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autonomy, or even to provide an argument for their ability to be independent. This response
was due, in part, to the ill-defined Europe of the Regions plan, which was left open to
subjective interpretations and uses. Regionalist parties in Scotland,41 Catalonia, and the
Basque country saw an opportunity to correlate their quest for regional self-government with
the greater cause of European integration42 and, consequently, to appeal to moderate voters.
Rather than its leading to nation-states’ becoming outdated, stateless nations, particularly in
these prosperous regions, saw it as an opportunity to pursue their own nation-state projects.
Second, the idea of Europe of the Regions proved naively oblivious to the substantive
role of national governments. As with minority issues, other than rhetorical encouragement,
the European Union has no competences in regulating regional relations and status within
member states. Each state has the sovereign freedom to determine the territorial delineation
of its regions, the extent of regional competences, and whether or not it will decentralize
certain powers to its regions. Any powers regions may have gained are due to internal
political reforms by states and the goodwill of those states to enact such reforms. Underlining
the paradox, Catalan independence leader Carles Puigdemont remarked that “a Europe of
regions created by the state is like electrical cars created by oil companies.”43 Regional
offices in Brussels are not part of any of the EU treaties and as such their role in the policy
process remains informal; thus, the impact of regions on an EU level has been described in
the literature as “marginal”44 and “subterranean.”45 The aftermath of recent attempts by EU
regions to proclaim independence has shown EU leadership backpedalling on the notion of
powerful regions and returning to the concept of strong and unified states as the most
appropriate and stable form of government.46
Nowadays, the Committee of the Regions (CoR), a specialized EU agency established in
1994 that comprises 350 representatives from regional and local governments of all EU
member states, is seen as the forum where substate actors can become involved in EU-level
policy discussions. The purpose of the CoR is to give “regions and cities a formal say in EU
law-making ensuring that the position and needs of regional and local authorities are
respected.”47 Nevertheless, this agency has shortcomings when it comes to providing the
necessary tools for stateless nations and autonomous regions to exercise requisite
representation at a European level. First, the committee is set up as an advisory body only,
open solely for submitting opinions and consultations that are nonbinding to the European
Union’s governing institutions, as determined in article 307 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union.48 Second, the CoR is not a setting where minorities, stateless or
otherwise, can get representation as a group, unless a member of a minority happens to be
elected as a local or regional official.49 Even so, that representative would not be acting on
behalf of a given minority or stateless nation but would instead be acting on behalf of the
local authority by which they were appointed. Finally, the fact that the CoR represents all
subnational entities on equal terms, combining large cultural regions with small
administrative regions and even municipalities, has been a source of its ineffectiveness in
truly filling in the democratic gap between cultural regions and EU policy-making, leading to
disappointment and frustration by those regions.50
The term “constitutional regions” has been used in the literature to describe the set of
cultural and large federal regions within the European Union that distinguish themselves from
other subnational entities by their legislative competences.51 These include the devolved
administrations of Scotland and Wales of the United Kingdom, the autonomous Spanish
communities, such as Catalonia and the Basque country, the Belgian provinces of Flanders
and Waloon, and the German and Austrian Länder, which, unlike smaller administrative
regions (particularly in new EU member states), also have a distinct historical or linguistic
identity. Thus, constitutional regions have been dissatisfied with the existing channels of
communication with the European Union, which stunt their influence by merging them with
9
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small administrative regions, and they have been lobbying together for a greater recognition
of their unique legal status in the European Union and their right to have a more prominent
role in its decision-making structures, particularly the European Commission.52 Thus far, the
most visible acquired right is the participation of regional ministers in the EU Council of
Ministers in cases involving those regions, under the clauses of article 203 of the Maastrich
Treaty, which set the foundation for a nonintermediary communication with large federal or
cultural regions.53 The participation of regional ministers in such meetings is dependent,
however, on the domestic constitutional arrangement of individual member states. For
example, in the United Kingdom and in Spain, the central government determines whether or
not regional ministers attend EU Council meetings. In contrast, Germany’s strong federal
political model enables the Länder to participate by default, an arrangement similar to the one
in Belgium.54
Perhaps the best-known EU approach for assisting regions is the aptly named “regional
policy,” a set of financial resources available for the development of regions. In simple terms,
EU’s regional policy, also known as “structural funds,” is effectively an instrument for
delivering regional aid, with the goal of assisting poorer regions to catch up with
economically stronger ones and achieve what is often referred to as economic, social, and
territorial cohesion within the European Union. More than a third of the 2018 EU budget is
dedicated to structural funds,55 one of the many reasons structural funds receive a good deal
of attention. They are promoted as the most palpable method through which regions have a
connection to Brussels and as an independent means of funding from their national
governments. Critics have charged, however, that the narrative around the funds is merely
symbolic, because, in practice, regions have no direct access to money from Brussels since
the sector is intergovernmental. The program, nevertheless, allows the European Union to get
some credit for providing for regional needs, while regional leaders have the semblance of
direct cooperation with central EU institutions.56
It can be concluded that, when it comes to opportunities for regions to partake in their
own right in the policy-making processes of the European Union and to address issues for
which there exists a discrepancy between the regional position and interests and the position
and interests of their central governments, there are mechanisms in place enabling them to do
so, but only if beforehand they secure constitutional concessions from their respective states
granting them the necessary status and competences to act. The European Union has in theory
supported the idea of proactive regions with sufficient powers to demystify traditional notions
of centralized states, because, for one thing, subnational identities are seen as complementary
to the strengthening of European identity. For this reason, the European Union has, at the
very least, never opposed devolution within its member states. Nevertheless, such internal
self-determination battles are to be fought on national arenas, a domain in which the
European Union has thus far not intervened. Finally, there appears to be disagreement among
researchers about whether the European Union as a supranational entity has opened up new
opportunities for regions to advance their self-government57 or whether it has constrained
them in their decision-making abilities.58

European Union Attitude toward Self-Determination: Legal and Political
Considerations
EU Law with Regard to Self-Determination of Peoples
The European Union, as a club of sovereign states, is organized in such a way that it
represents the interests of those states through decision-making and voting mechanisms that
allow individual member states and their governing institutions to act on behalf of the peoples
that live in their territories as a collective. Paragraphs 6, 9, and 12 of the Preamble of the
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Treaty on European Union refers to this system by which signatory states take on measures as
representatives of “their peoples,” indicating an implied equality within the framework of the
European Union between peoples and citizens. Examples in the literature support these
changing perceptions of nations, arguing that in the era of globalization all people living
within a state should identify with that state, setting aside the ethnic-centered understanding
of “peoples”59—a concept already embraced by several European states, implementing the
civic form of nationalism. Nevertheless, following the classical line of thinking about nations,
not all peoples in Europe have their own state; thus, it follows that only those European
peoples who have had the historical opportunity to establish a national state are able to
participate in the co-determination processes of the European Union.
There is no mention in the treaties of the European Union of a right to self-determination
of those peoples or of self-determination in general. The question arises: Since general
international law forms part of EU law and consequently is binding for EU member states
and institutions, are specific references in EU law needed for the right to self-determination
of peoples to be legally enforceable on EU territory, or is it a right stateless nations in Europe
can exercise by extension?
The European Court of Justice made a valuable contribution to the debate on December
21, 2016, when, in its ruling concerning Western Sahara, it found that “the customary
principle of self-determination referred to in particular in Article 1 of the Charter of the
United Nations is . . . a principle of international law applicable to all non-self-governing
territories and to all peoples who have not yet achieved independence. It is, moreover, a
legally enforceable right erga omnes and one of the essential principles of international law”
(italics added). 60 While it is clear that the court decision refers to Western Sahara’s frozen
decolonization process and not a general EU context, in its ruling the court chose not to refer
specifically to the context of decolonization but instead to stress that the right to selfdetermination applies to all people. Similarly, the court chose to quote article 1 of the UN
Charter rather than one of the many UN resolutions that deal uniquely with the right to selfdetermination of peoples under colonial rule. This choice has led to some interpretations of
the words of the court to mean that the right to self-determination is legally applicable to
stateless nations in the European Union, such as the Flemish, Basques, Catalans, and Scots.61
The wording in the decision by the European Court of Justice is in line with the
conclusions made in 2010 by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. At the time, the international court rightly
remarked:
[D]uring the second half of the twentieth century, the international law of selfdetermination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the
peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation. . . . A great many new States have come into existence
as a result of the exercise of this right. There were, however, also instances of
declarations of independence outside this context. The practice of States in these latter
cases does not point to the emergence in international law of a new rule prohibiting
the making of a declaration of independence in such cases.62
This conclusion, with the 2016 European Court of Justice ruling, makes it clear that the right
to (external) self-determination of peoples, within or outside the context of remedial
secession, is not specifically forbidden by international law and therefore not forbidden by
EU law, which itself incorporates positive contemporary international law.63
Nevertheless, a close examination of EU law sources reveals that self-determination as a
concept, principle, or human right is absent from these texts. Certain European human rights
instruments such as the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe
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of 1990 do feature references to self-determination. But as international treaties, they are
political, rather than legal, documents and do not form part of European law. Although
stemming from international law, the EU treaties effectively create a “new legal order”64 for
member states and their citizens that differs from public international law.65 Thus, the theory
suggests that, while EU law cannot prohibit self-determination of peoples, it does not
explicitly support self-determination of peoples either.66
A source from the European Commission has expressed the belief that the existence of
conflicts between states and some of their regions is potentially the reason there is no EU
regulation on self-determination of peoples.67 Because of the political sensitivity of the issue,
there should be a balance between EU law and international law. In this context, while the
European Commission is aware that there are regional identities, they can be supported only
in as much as they do not collide with the national identity of member states,68 because
respect for national identity, as well as the territorial integrity, of member states is enshrined
in article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union, even though the same article also discusses
support for regional and local self-government.
EU Statements on Self-Determination to the United Nations
Because of the lack of any official legal documents referencing self-determination in the
European Union, the union’s position on issues stemming from this principle of international
law can be observed only from official EU statements made in the forums of the United
Nations. In October 2001, for example, at a meeting of the Third Committee of the General
Assembly, which deals with social, humanitarian, and cultural issues, a representative spoke
on behalf of the European Union on the agenda item concerning the right to selfdetermination of peoples. There, the European Union took the opportunity to reaffirm the
relevance of that right in the contemporary international context as an integral part of
fundamental human rights, as exemplified by its inclusion in the UN Charter and the two
International Covenants on Human Rights. It is clear from this statement that the European
Union sees the right to self-determination as part of the broader family of universal human
rights, because a significant portion of the statement focuses on calling for respect for
democratic principles and liberties, which are perceived to be directly related to the
invocation of peoples’ right to self-determination. In a 2001 speech before the United
Nations, a representative from the EU delegation noted that “making this right a reality
requires full observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on the part of States,”
thus identifying human rights as a de-facto precondition to the enjoyment of the right to selfdetermination. 69 It was the delegation’s position that certain conditions need to be present in
order for the right to self-determination to be applied, such as freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly, but most important the right to vote, through which people can give a
mandate to the representatives who best serve their interests. This interesting interpretation of
self-determination as analogous to a democratic system was further reiterated in the statement
that holding elections is not just a condition but an “expression of the right of peoples to selfdetermination” and “the process of democratization is an essential stage in the recognition of
the right of peoples to self-determination.” In a similar statement to the United Nations in
2003, an EU representative concluded by saying that the “EU wishes to strongly reaffirm that
the right to self-determination includes the opportunity for each individual to follow, support,
and criticize actions of political institutions of their countries.”70
While it stands to reason that the right to self-determination is related to other human
rights, not least because of its inclusion in the International Covenants on Human Rights, the
European Union appears to be equating this right to the presence of democracy in a society to
an extent that eclipses the essence of what self-determination of peoples truly means. This
simplification of self-determination to mean participation of citizens in the political processes
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of states, or the expression of their political will through elected institutions, neglects the
territorial aspects of the right to self-determination. It also overshadows the common article 1
of the International Covenants on Human Rights, according to which the right to selfdetermination of peoples means freedom to determine their political status in whatever form
of social order that may be. By issuing these statements and tactically framing the matter of
self-determination of peoples in this manner, the European Union sets out the basis for and
limits the context in which it chooses to promote the implementation and respect of the right
to self-determination internationally—by calling for the spread of democracy and rule of law
around the world.
In later years, EU representatives argued this case even more directly in a discussion of
the content of the UN resolution drafts on the right of peoples to self-determination. (These
resolutions, for the most part, retain the same format and wording year after year and are
adopted as a matter of procedure, without a vote, first in the Third Committee of the General
Assembly and later in the General Assembly sessions.) In November 2005, the United
Kingdom mission to the United Nations spoke on behalf of the European Union about the
resolution titled “Universal Right of Peoples to Self-Determination” to “explain the basis
upon which the EU has been able to join consensus . . . on the resolution.”71 More
specifically, the statement underscored the areas in which the resolution did not fully
correspond to the positions held by the European Union with respect to the right to selfdetermination and offered the general EU interpretation of that right within the broader
context of human rights. The European Union referred to the right to self-determination as a
“pillar” of the international order, intrinsically related to a democratic system that embraces
the rule of law, stating that “respect for the right of self-determination requires the holding of
free, regular and fair elections,”72 which in essence poses human rights as a precondition to
the enjoyment of the right to self-determination. The European Union expressed its regret that
there had been no opportunity to open a discussion on the text of the resolution so that it
might better reflect the practice of self-determination, even though the text has remained
almost entirely unchanged since 1980.73 Furthermore, the European Union noted that the
resolution text contained certain inaccuracies under international law that needed to be
addressed, specifically objecting to the mention of the right to self-determination of peoples
and nations in the third preambular clause of the resolution.74 The EU position was that the
right applies only to “peoples” and not to “nations” according to the International Covenants
on Human Rights, which are a source of international law.
Perhaps the most important remark in the European Union’s statement that best clarifies
the its stance on the topic of self-determination was in response to the first operative clause of
the resolution draft, where the right to self-determination of all peoples is named as the basis
for the promotion of other human rights,75 to which the European Union objected: “Though
as already mentioned the EU firmly believes that self-determination is closely associated with
respect for all human rights, it is not correct to suggest that self-determination as such is a
pre-condition for the enjoyment of other human rights.”76 The same position, with negligible
alterations, was expressed by EU representatives in 200677 and was repeated again in 2009.78
It is the European Union’s opinion that self-determination of peoples is not a necessary
condition for the presence and respect of other human rights and that human rights and
liberties can be present even in the absence of self-determination. Furthermore, as previously
noted, it can be inferred from all EU statements to the United Nations on the matter that the
European Union views human rights as a precondition for self-determination, not the other
way around. Conversely, going back to the instances where the European Union equated the
enjoyment of self-determination with respect for civil liberties and holding free elections, a
second conclusion could be that peoples who already enjoy a full range of human rights are
by nature able to self-determine (by expressing their political will through voting). Thus, it
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would follow that, to the European Union, seeking independence, or what is known as
external self-determination, becomes redundant in a democracy because of the wide range of
opportunities for internal self-determination.
EU Practice of Recognition of New Independent States
Because new demands for recognition of independence by stateless nations continue to
proliferate within and outside EU borders, it has become more imperative than ever to
develop a principled approach in addressing each of these claims, enabling due
considerations for the rights of peoples concerned, as well as the individual circumstances of
each case. But in the light of the lack of norms in EU law pertaining to the right to selfdetermination of peoples, we turn to earlier cases and look at the history of political decisions
the European Union made when confronted by demands for recognition by newly
independent states on the European continent in the past. A second wave of mass
independence declarations in the twentieth century that occurred across Eastern, Central, and
Southern Europe in the early 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, brought along a set of legal
and moral uncertainties. The European Community needed to respond to the severity of these
changes occurring in the global order. This was a turning point in history, where for the first
time since the process of decolonization began, there had been multiple simultaneous
demands for self-determination of peoples, requiring the European Community to come up
with a (coordinated) response on the question of their recognition and, consequently, to usher
an irreversible change to the international status quo.
Taking the example of the Yugoslav federation, as claims for independence and military
clashes emerged in Slovenia and Croatia in the summer of 1991, the European Community’s
initial response was to try to preserve the existing, yet failing, federation, and thus uphold the
political status quo. As Roland Rich points out, there was fear that the Yugoslav dissolution
would set in motion many self-determination claims in the Soviet Union and destabilize this
nuclear power.79 Outside of the European Community, very few other international powers
took interest in the developments.80 Overall, the few ambiguous statements the European
Community made on the topic indicate that they supported the preservation of the territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia, in line with the accepted presumption in international politics that
“favours the continuity and disfavours the extinction of an established State.”81 But at the
same time it was made clear that there was no plan to intervene should a secession come
about.
In the end, as the disintegration of Yugoslavia appeared to be irreversible, the European
Community took on a leading role in responding to the political and legal complications
emerging from it. The foreign ministers of the European Community met in Brussels and
issued a declaration containing common guidelines that set the normative basis for the
recognition of the new states emerging in Eastern Europe. 82 It was the first document of its
kind setting out the legal framework for the position of the European Union toward more than
a dozen new entities, many of whom made unilateral declarations of independence. At the
same time, it represented an expansion on the Montevideo criteria for statehood and a defined
list of conditions for recognition. The declaration contains several noteworthy elements. The
first is the inclusion of self-determination in the text as one of the principles guiding the
European Community in its response to the new historical realities in Eastern Europe. Until
then, self-determination was understood almost exclusively as a tool in the decolonization
process.
Second, the declaration added to the traditional Montevideo criteria. The four original
criteria from the Montevideo Convention for an entity to be considered an independent state
were for that state to have a permanent population, a defined territory, а government, and the
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capacity to enter into relations with the other states. The Declaration of the European Council
contains the additional requirement of a democratic governance for any new state wishing to
be recognized as independent. Before the European Council declaration, having a political
system different from a democracy had never been an obstacle, or a factor, in the recognition
of new states. As Cedric Ryngaert and Sven Sobrie note, “the traditional legal framework had
never concerned itself with the internal organisation of a would-be state, as this would have
been considered an unlawful interference in this state’s internal affairs.”83 The declaration
adds another three criteria to the traditional legal framework: the new state should not have
been created through the use of aggression, it should commit to respecting minority rights,
and it should commit to disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. With the declaration, the
European Council had drafted what can be described as an exhaustive, detailed, and strict
normative framework, according to which requests for recognition of new states would be
evaluated, that represented an expansion of the body of international norms dealing with the
question of statehood.
Furthermore, the European Council established the Arbitration Commission on
Yugoslavia, which was assigned to evaluate each state’s adherence to the criteria. It was
unclear at first what the mandate of this commission would be. The initial idea was that the
commission would issue binding decisions on thorny issues concerning, for example, the
right to self-determination, recognition, and state succession on the request of what they
called “valid Yugoslavian authorities.” By supporting the work of the Arbitration
Commission, the European Community. it appeared, at least initially, would pay as much
attention to international law provisions as political considerations in the process of state
recognition.84 In the end, the commission’s role was to offer nonbinding legal opinions,
which proved to be a valuable addition to the body of international law on the topic of selfdetermination of peoples through political independence.
Before the Arbitration Commission had a chance to issue any recommendations,
however, Germany issued a statement announcing that it would recognize Slovenia and
Croatia, because in the view of the German government these two states met the conditions
set by the European Community.85 Germany had been at odds with its European partners,
previously stating it would recognize these two states, even if no one else did. From the
beginning, the European Community had difficulty speaking with one voice and finding a
common stance on this issue: While France was a strong proponent of preserving the
integrity of the federation of Yugoslavia, states such as Germany and Belgium appeared
somewhat open to the potential recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states.
What might be some of the reasons for such a foreign policy decision on Germany’s part?
Many at the time argued that Germany was attempting to create its region of influence.
Slovenia and Croatia were historically part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and culturally
connected to the German-speaking and Catholic part of Europe. In fact, German recognition
of these two newly independent states came on a highly symbolic date—December 24, the
day Roman Catholics celebrate Christmas Eve. Furthermore, many immigrant workers from
Yugoslavia resided in Germany, most of which were of Croatian origin, and many of them
had the right to vote and lobbied the government to recognize Croatia.86
The Arbitration Commission shortly afterward found that only Slovenia and Macedonia
fully satisfied the conditions for recognition, whereas Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
needed to take additional measures. Nevertheless, the recommendations of the Arbitration
Commission were not legally binding and different interests took precedence. Thus, many
Roman Catholic European states extended their recognition to Slovenia and Croatia but not to
Macedonia, which is predominantly Orthodox, or Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is
predominantly Muslim and Orthodox. Others sought to retain unity within the European
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Community and consented to Germany’s position, demonstrating the growing power and
influence Germany had within the European Community.87
David Raič has addressed these events by noting that EU states approached the situation
by following political interests at the expense of international law: “It has been suggested that
the recognition of the new States which were formed within the boundaries of the former
Yugoslavia . . . must mainly be explained in terms of politics. In other words, the creation and
recognition of these new States should be seen to have taken place mainly outside the domain
of international law.”88 In the end, both Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were
eventually recognized by the EU member states and accepted into the international
community of states, though war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina far sooner than Macedonia,
despite Macedonia’s being the one that met all the legal conditions, which gives further
credence to the political character of European Union’s practice of recognizing of new states.
The European Union made similar considerations in the case of Kosovo’s unilateral
declaration of independence. In a press release the day after Kosovo declared independence,
the Council of the European Union stated that individual member states will make their own
decisions on their relations with Kosovo in consideration of their “national practice and
international law.”89 There was no detailed normative framework of criteria that Kosovo was
required to meet before recognition, such as that which the European Community required of
the other republics that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia seventeen years earlier.
Moreover, no assessment was made even of compliance with the Montevideo criteria, the
third of which is having an effective government that operates independently from external
control. Kosovo’s not meeting this criterion, because of the continued and influential
participation of the UN and EU missions in its governance, was one of the many problems.90
In the end, member states chose to proceed solely with political expedience for guidance.
In their research on the international reactions following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration
of independence, Ryngaert and Sobrie found that scarcely any mention of international law
was made in statements, with recognition of Kosovo widely justified by political parameters,
such as “the need for stability, peace, and security in the region.”91 In cases such as these
where an entity is deficient in meeting some of the statehood criteria, the widespread
recognition by most of the EU member states could be interpreted to have had a constitutive
effect on the state of Kosovo.
Appeals to the international law aspects of territorial integrity and state sovereignty have
been made primarily by those countries that opposed recognition of Kosovo, such as Spain,
Romania, and Cyprus. But in saying so, I would be remiss not to note the grave fear in those
countries of active secessionist movements within their own territory and, consequently, their
determination to block setting any precedent of recognition to breakaway states. Even their
statements on the legality of the new state were motivated by political interests, rather than
considerations of international law. The EU member states that did recognize Kosovo were
concerned at least about the danger of the possible interpretations and consequences of such a
precedent to the established international order and therefore always emphasized that the
recognition of Kosovo was a sui generis case. Ironically, in a press release, the EU Council
insisted that the European Union continued to adhere “to the principles of the UN Charter and
the Helsinki Final Act, inter alia the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and all
UN Security Council resolutions” but went on to say that Kosovo does not represent a breach
of those “principles and resolutions.”92
An examination of recognition history shows that the European Union has approached
newly independent states in the wider European region with an eye to security-driven
implications more so than concerns for international law or respect for human rights. As this
review shows, examining the earlier practice of recognition of new states by the European
Union does little to determine a pattern of specific requirements to be met by aspiring new
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states, within or outside the European Union, which would render them entitled to EU
recognition, since a “varying degree of attention [was] paid to international law depending on
political considerations and strategic interests in each case.”93 In the past, the European
Union had chosen pragmatism over normative considerations, leaving the door open to
uncertainty and political manhandling for all self-determination claims since.

Concluding Observations
EU law contains no provisions concerning self-determination of peoples, as a principle or a
right. The absence of such provisions in the text of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is
noticeable and is clearly due to the political sensitivity of the issue. But international law is
an integral part of EU law, and, thus, it follows that self-determination is an indisputable right
of all peoples that ought to be respected, even without its being emphasized in EU law. This
view was confirmed in a ruling of the European Court of Justice in 2016, which describes
self-determination as a legally enforceable right erga omnes. Nevertheless, though stemming
from international law, the EU treaties effectively create a new legal order for member states
and their citizens that is different from international public law. Thus, even though EU law
cannot act contrary to international norms, there is no explicit support in it for the right to
self-determination of peoples. The European Union is, after all, a club of states and, as such,
protects the interests of these countries as sole representatives of all citizens on their territory.
In addition, ideologically and systematically, the European project is considered incompatible
with the aspiration for self-determination of peoples or national sovereignty. Actions that
might highlight the differences between different peoples in Europe are discouraged because
the European Union is a political entity that strives to build a civic and supranational identity
among its citizens in support of the project for a European political union.
The European Union has made noticeable efforts to interpret the self-determination of
peoples as respect for human rights and the existence of a democratic system. The European
Union believes that nations that already enjoy a wide range of human rights are naturally able
to self-determine by participating in elections and that demands for independence are
unnecessary in democratic states because of the existence of a representative democracy and
the wide range of opportunities for internal self-determination. The European Union tries to
tackle the diversity of peoples within its borders through support and commitment to a certain
degree of minority, linguistic, and regional rights. But when it comes to policies relating to
minorities, languages, and regions, the European Union’s commitments are mainly
declarative, since the principle of subsidiarity means that decisions and legislation on these
issues are a discretionary right of individual member states. The problem lies in the European
Union’s institutional inability to produce any mandatory top-down mechanisms for member
states, which in turn allows countries to refuse the measures they consider a threat to their
national project. There are striking differences between member states in whether and to what
extent minority, linguistic, or regional rights of stateless nations are recognized, and any
gains on these forms of internal self-determination have been due solely to the goodwill of
some member states to enact such policies.
Past cases of recognition of newly independent states in the wider European region by
EU member states have been inconsistent, arbitrary, and dependent on the strategic interests
of individual member states. Thus, it becomes apparent that the European Union has no clear
normative criteria governing state recognition. Nevertheless, EU practice also demonstrates
that the European Union has recognized virtually every independence claim emerging in
Europe in recent decades (with the exception perhaps of Republika Srpska and partially that
of Kosovo). Furthermore, the European Union has had no qualms about welcoming Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Croatia within its club, despite their being states all of which
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at one time challenged the status quo of territorial borders and declared independence against
the wishes of their parent state. As recent practice tells us, the European Union does
recognize the outcomes of self-determination movements as a factual situation, once they
have materialized into effective independent states.
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